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MUNICIPAL INCORPORATION UNDER LAFCO: A CRITICAL VIEW 
In the mid-1950's, two factors came together to initiate an 
avalanche of municipal incorporations in Los Angeles County. The Lakewood 
Plan allowed cities to contract economically for urban services from the 
county or other large producers, thus realizing economies of scale without 
annexation to a large city. Secondly, the Bradley-Bums Sales Tax of 1956 
provided a means of financing a minimal level of services without municipal 
property taxation, and minimal services were generally sufficient for 
middle-class housing developments with no blight, no poverty, little crime, 
and lots of open space. There were 31 municipal incorporations in the 
decade after 1954. 
Many of these incorporations were "special interest" incorpora-
tions, designed for specific tax advantage to small groups of people or 
businesses. Irwindale, for instance, was incorporated by the gravel 
companies in the San Gabriel Valley who were benef itting from the rapid 
expansion in the region's freeway system and did not want to have it 
spoiled by annexation to Azusa or some other property-taxing city. 
Industry was incorporated in 1957 along 18 miles of Southern Pacific 
and Union Pacific Railroad track. It was just wide enough to protect a 
large proportion of the county's industry from municipal property taxation, 
but not wide enough to have more than 700 residents. 
While somewhat less narrowly interested, the motivation for 
other municipalities formed during this decade was clearly to include a 
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revenue base while excluding (by means of local control over / zoning) 
undesirable characteristics or land uses such as low-cost housing 
concentrations, wrecking yards, or certain kinds of industry ! Commerce I 
and Santa Fe Springs carved out chunks of territory that included 
ff . . . f .  I su icient property to guarantee a per capita assessment igµre many 
times that of most of the rest of the county; however, salesltax revenue 
permitted low municipal tax rates. Rolling Hills, Rolling Hills Estates, 
Hidden Hills, Bradbury, and Walnut incorporated as exclusive suburbs, 
with restrictive zoning ordinances that limited access to on�y a small 
class of people. 
The institutional process of urban growth was thusl one that 
encouraged fierce municipal competition for resources, and equally fierce 
municipal antipathy toward undesirable housing and land use batterns. 
This worked fine for those cities that were successful in thb competition, 
but it was not clear that municipal competition was the 
framework for overall, long-run urban growth. The ease 
bestl institutional 
withl wJich munici-
palities and special districts could be formed to service nei developments 
encouraged developers to use land in a profligate way. Deve�opment rushed 
I 
! 
outward from central Los Angeles along transportation routes t9ward the 
Orange and San Bernardino County lines, often on land that trrfed out to
be in flooding zones, unsuitable for septic tanks, far from fire stations 
or other emergency services, or unable to handle increased tla�fic burdens. 
Undeoirnble l.md wao lefc ouc of �itlpol incorporoCiono, +oul<ing in 
awkward islands, often with a desperate need for urban services. With much 
f h bl · · · 1 .  · h h d I : · o t e taxa e property in municipa ities t at a no proper�y1taxation, 
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the cost of municipal services fell all the harder on these jurisdictions 
that did rely on property taxation, with often a much weaker tax base. 
These problems were magnified many times over throughout the 
state of California, and as a result, in 1963, a major effort to reform 
institutional procedures for urban growth was made under Governor Pat 
Brown's administration. The avowed purpose was to put urban growth 
under a more comprehensive, less competitive governmental framework, and 
to attack the problem of disparities of tax levels and of urban services 
between municipalities. 
Drawing on studies and recommendations by the Governor's 
Commission on Metropolitan Area Problems, and influenced by the County 
Supervisors Association of California, the Knox-Nisbet Act of 1963 
established county-level agencies to review municipal incorporations and 
annexations, and special district formations and annexations. These 
local agency formation commissions, or LAFCOs, are composed of two county 
supervisors selected by the county board, two representatives of the 
cities elected by the mayors of the cities in the county, and one public 
representative selected by the other four LAFCO board members. They are 
empowered to disapprove any petition for incorporation, special district 
formation, or dissolution. For municipal incorporation petitions, they 
may exclude territory from a proposed incorporation. The County Board 
of Supervisors then decides whether or not to grant a petition for an 
election in the proposed city, and in so doing, may also exclude terri-
tory from the incorporation. The election then decides the issue. 
LAFCO is essentially an extra review step in the incorporation 
proceeding: before its creation, the County Board of Supervisors performed 
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vireually <he '=e f=odon tlone, wi<h vinutlly <he a�e powOJ 
Par< of <he purpoae in orea<ing � ag�oy oh�ged wi!h 1�plioi< 
overview of the municipal incorporation process was to have an agency 
staff of professionals with responsibility for making studies on lthe 
land use and other impacts of incorporation proposals. The vittually 
unanimous opinion of observers of the Los Angeles LAFCO is thal dtaff 
reports and recommendations are a key influence on agency decibiJns, and
that, without important other reasons, the LAFCO ratifies stafk jecommen­
dations. The reasons for this are also widely agreed upon. The lLAFCO 
hoard member' are h�y wi<h o<her p�feaaion,, and <here is lif •le ''"'"' 
aaaooia<ed wi<h 'i<<ing on <he oommiB'i� �e<ing' <wi� a "°"fh j In 1973, 
County Commissioner Debs said, "I got off of LAFCO. That was thl greatest 
thing that ever happened to me as far as I was concerned, but �ad a I 
tough time getting off. I had to wait for someone to get elected so I 
could get off. The newcomers get all the bad--things, and I Jasla new­
comer. I inherited it." (Los Angeles County Board of SupervJsors, 1973:9.) 
The LAFCO members have no incentive to do their own lrebearch, but 
there is a sizeable cost attached to checking staff reports fdr lccuracy. 
Furthermore, the LAFCO members are very aware of being only aj irl termediate 
1 .  k . h . f d . . . d f . . I B .d in in a c ain o a ministrative proce ures or incorporation. esi es 
the county supervisors hearing, it is always possible to pass lthe decision 
on to the voters, as the "democratic way". 
For all these reasons, the LAFCO has little reason tlo �ake 
their job seriously enough to do their own research. This melnsl that 
they are left with the staff report as being the major cue fol decisions. 
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As one observer said, "The Commission will always back the staff because 
she is their mule, she does the work for them." 
How well have the LAFCO board and staff responded to the 
challenge of rationalizing the process of municipal incorporation? Has 
the devil of political influence been exorcised? Is there promise of 
dealing effectively with the problems of urban sprawl, unincorporated 
"islands", and inequality of urban finance? The first municipal incor-
poration under LAFCO was that of Carson; this was an illuminating case, 
which says much about the effectiveness of LAFCO in working towards its 
announced goals. 
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The Case of Carson 
Long Beach has long been a competitor with the city [of[ Los 
Angeles for leadership in the Southern California basin. At dhelturn 
of the century it had sought to obtain the same San Pedro-Wiljington 
harbor area that eventually became the port of Los Angeles, a1d ln 
failing, had built its own harbor. During the decade after 11001, it 
had the greatest population growth rate in the nation, from tlo to 
seventeen thousand. During Los Angeles' most aggressive annexatlon 
period in the twenties, Long Beach had made its own annexatioj clmpaign
to the north, during which decade it almost tripled its popul1tiln to 
reach 142,000. 
It suffered a temporary set-back in 1924, when oil companies 
"''PP•d Long Boaoh fr� a�oxing tho gr�t Signa.t Hill nil fill,, by
incorporating Signal Hill as a separate city completely surrolnid by
Long Beach. But more petroleum lay beneath the city controllld tide­
lands, providing inexpensive energy for a municipal power com�a� and 
revenue for recreation and development of the harbor. I 
During the Second World War, Long Beach became the lodation of 
major military installati�s. In th• pnst-w� h�sing bn�, l�g Beaoh 
mado new ��atinns al�g its north•� border. It hnpod tn tv,id �jnr 
controversy by making its acquisitions small and piece-meal, bu, it
pl�•d nn �jnr lnng-te� �qu1'iti�s nf the open spaoe bo�e� it 
and Whittier, far to the north. I Then the developer Louis Boyar obtained sufficient FHA
Iguarantees to secure huge loans for most of the development costls of 
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Lakewood Park, launched in 1950 with the purchase of over 3000 acres of 
farm land. He built 11the biggest single-ownership development in the 
nation • • •  twice as big as the famed Levittown of Long Island, New York.11 
[Nadeau, 402.] In only three years, Lakewood had a middle-class popu­
lation of 77,000. While remaining officially neutral, Long Beach 
campaigned to annex Lakewood, and more to the point, keep it from 
incorporating and blocking its northward campaign for more land. A 
primary element in the campaign was the argument that Long Beach could 
not economically support sufficient urban services for the development, 
but this argument was deferred by the county' s intervention in the form 
of the Lakewood Plan, mentioned earlier. 
With similar failures in Bellflower and Paramount, in 1957, 
Long Beach' s hopes for growth to the north were shattered. In fact, 
there was only o�e further avenue of growth, the 30 square mile Carson-
Dominguez area to the west, between Long Beach, Compton to its north, 
and Los Angeles' 11shoestring" which connected the central city with 
the Port of Los Angeles. 
It is not surprising, then, that Long Beach in 1957 became 
intensely interested in annexing parts of the Carson area. This was 
especially true because the Carson area was especially attractive for 
tax resources and development. It had a significant amount of oil 
extraction, and was developing into a major industrial center, locate� 
as it was on major highway routes between the harbor and central city. 
Thus, in 1958, an attempt to annex the Dominguez-Lincoln 
Village area just west of Long Beach was made. It failed because of 
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a technical problem with the definition of the boundaries. /In/ 1960, 
Long Beach encouraged a pro-annexation movement on the partlof 
inhabitants of the same area, which eventually died out from J!ack of 
enthusiasm. 
But these two attempts at annexation by Long Beaca, Jalong with 
a 1958 attempt by gambling interests to incorporate the healt lof CarsonI as a gambling town, were enough to start serious incorporation attempts. -
I . In 1960, an insurance agency owner, Jack Carpenter, /backed by 
Dominguez Chamber of Commerce and local businesses, attemptld Ito incor-1 porate the entire 30-square-mile Carson-Dominguez area. ThisJattempt 
failed quickly due to strong opposition by home-owners and l dommittee 
of forty industrial leaders, who feared higher tax rates, aldldid not 
believe annexation by Long Beach was a serious threat. I
A much smaller incorporation attempt was made in i961, con­
sisting of only 6 square miles. This attempt failed when rlplesentatives 
of 'he C�'� Proper'y Owner,, and 'he Indue,rie' Cummi,<ee, /h�gerl 'ha' 
two signatures on incorporation petitions were forgeries. �e Board of 
Supervisors postponed the hearing due to the controversy surrlunding this 
charge, and property owners representing 51% of the propert� ln the pro­
posed incorporation area signed a petition protesting the Jiclrporations, 
which killed the proposal for another year. I 
In 1963, incorporationists switched to a strateg� of starting 
�11, hoping 'o incorpora'e a riny (leee 'h� 2 'q�re miJe,f area 
wi,hou' c�'rover,y, and 'hen begin �n�ing. "The idea wje rain1y 'o
eliminate practically all the larger landowners whose excljsions would
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bring the same failure as before. " [Jerrils, 1972:110] . Yet even this 
incorporation attempt failed due to intense organization by the Carson 
Homeowners Association, which insisted that the incorporation would bring 
higher taxes. Industrialists outside the tiny proposal, fearing future 
annexations, still opposed the incorporation attempt, this time ironically 
charging that the city was too small, and had too small a tax base, to be 
a viable city. Once again opposition petitions by property-owners repre-
senting over half of the assessable property were presented to the board 
of supervisors. 
After this attempt, Long Beach' s fears about Carson' s incor-
poration, and Carson' s fears about Long Beach' s annexation, began to feed 
on each other more intensively. As Carson made more er.edible moves for 
incorporation, Long Beach launched more desperate annexation attempts; 
the net result was to convince Carson home-owners and industrialists that 
they had no choice besides incorporation or annexation to Long Beach. 
Immediately after the 1963 failure of incorporation, Long Beach 
made its most daring annexation proposal--"a jagged dagger • • .  aimed right 
at the heart of the Carson-Dominguez community. If successful, this 
attempt would have killed the community' s chances of ever becoming a city. " 
[Jerrils, 1972:115.] This was especially potent, because the annexation 
proposal, though it actually did go all the way to the heart of Carson, 
followed a circuitous route so that it was technically an "uninhabited 
annexation", involving the residences of fewer than 12 persons and requiring 
little more than the approval of the property-owners, which happened to be 
a major land-development corporation. By protesting before the County 
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Board of Supervisors, the incorporationists were able to stop tHislthreat. 
Following <hi• <hrea< fr= Long Beach, <he indu•<rial1''' io 
Carson took their first serious look at incorporation. The inco}rplration 
attempt of the same year, 1964, was again a large incorporation rlposal, 
of 25. 6 square miles. Thia time, the Dominguez Industrial Comm•ttle 
appoin<ed a •ub-c-mee wiCh rnpm�ca<iveo of Shell Oil Co . .I + 
Watson Land Co. , the Stauffer Chemical Co. , the Southern Califo�ia Gas Co. , the Santa Fe Railroad and the Dominguez Water Corporation. This slb­
committee was to survey the proposed incorporation from the indjsttial 
per'Pec<lve. Thi• c-iccee hired a con•ulcing fi� which con�ldld, in September of 1964, that no property tax would be necessary to succlssfully 
operate the new city, and consequently urged incorporation rathel 1han 
annexation to Long Beach as the preferable alternative for the alel's 
indu•Cry. H�ver, Chey •uggesced deferring Che curr�C incorpo�ali� 
attempt, in order to build support for an incorporation filing i'n 1uly, 1965.
In 1965, Chere wao •=e oppooiCion Co incorporacion b+.Le of 
delays in the county' s program of major street improvements. "One l industry 
spokesman said the new city could end up paying for all street iLptovements 
if incorporation were attempted at this time. This could mean a ' 15¢ per $100 
valuaci� propercy c� co •��er•' ic wao poinced �c. " [Jer[ij,, 1972,121. )
By November, despite the fact that the consultants' report had lrdlto greater pro-incorporation feeling than ever before among home-owners, industry 
decided that it would not support incorporation for one or two mbrl years. 
In 1966, Gordon Nesvig, Executive Secretary of LAFCO, brlposed a 
one-year moratorium on apy annexation incorporation. The incorpbrltionists 
violently opposed this proposal, feeling that they were on the vbr�e of a 
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successful incorporation, feeling that LAFCO was not pre-disposed to 
incorporation by Carson, and because "an adverse decision could have 
been the fatal blow that would stop all future incorporation attempts." 
[Jerrils, 1972:123.] LAFCO received a $50,000 grant from the county to 
study the Carson problem, but the incorporationists appealed success­
fully to the Board of Supervisors to stop those funds from being 
delivered to LAFCO. 
In a series of meetings a final working coalition between 
home-owners and industry was worked out. Home-owners wanted local 
control over zoning, and no property taxes, and industry concurred 
heartily in the latter sentiment. In 1966, an incorporation proposal 
for over 29 square miles was filed, making it the largest incorporation 
proposal ever made in Los Angeles County. 
In September of 1966, the crucial LAFCO hearing occurred. 
Gordon Nesvig, the Executive Direction, proposed to deny the incorporation 
petition at that time, and was supported by the LAFCO board. 
However, at the following meeting of the County Board of 
Supervisors, Supervisor Kenneth Hahn, representing the county district 
that included Carson (but not Long Beach) charged that the political 
influence of Long Beach had been felt at the Carson hearing 
I was shocked to find out that the (LAFCO) Commission by 
a three-to-two vote turned down the petition of the people in 
the Carson-Dominguez area. Now, the reason I am shocked is 
because I felt it was a stacked deck against them even before 
the meeting started. Of the five members there, our very able 
Chairman, Burton Chace, who was former mayor of Long Beach, sat 
in as a substitute for Warren Dorn. Then they had a Councilman 
of Long Beach, Mr. Bond served, and then the Chairman of the 
Committee, I think it is Mr. Hotchkiss, who has vast holdings 
representing the Bixby estate in Long Beach. So even before 
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they appeared the citizens felt it was a stacked deck against them. 
They couldn' t even get a fair hearing . • .  they have been afr�id that 
Long Beach, with all its power, was going to annex their l u�inhabited 
area, especially where the oil wells are • • . •
In 1967, the accelerating momentum of the Carson anne�ation 
drive led to a rash of annexation proposals, not only by Long f B�ach, which 
filed 3 annexation proposals, but also by Los Angeles and Comptqn, which 
filed two each. In July, 1967, a LAFCO hearing approved
.
a stlfn recommen-1 dation that approved one annexation for each of these three cit�es, and 
resulted in further exclusions totally 45% of the proposed inlo,poration. 
The exclusions resulted in a corridor of land being left vacaht between 
I Los Angeles and Carson on Carson' s western border, and a large area of 
l�d be<ween Lnng Beach �d C�pr� nn Carenn' a �rrhe�r cnrl.1. (Parra 
of the excluded land have subsequently been annexted by all ok tthe cities 
involved.) I j 
The opposition of LAFCO to Carson' s incorporation, an the 
granting of annexation proposals and exclusions that reduced halson' s 
territory by almost one-half resulted in deep-seated antagonibm l and 
distrust for LAFCO on the part of the local incorporationistsl. After all. 
the frustrations of the previous attempts, including oppositipn l by Long 
Beach, home-owner and 
"it is almost certain 
industrial reluctance, and even charges! of fraud, 
that the majority of cityhood proponentls tould
agree that the Local Agency Formation and Annexation Commissi!onl (sic) I , of frustration to their cause." contributed the most in quantity and kind 
[Jerrils, 1972:113.] 
After finally getting approval from LAFCO for the smaller 
version of Carson, the strong coalition of business, industrJ ahd home-
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owners which had spent a decade in forming, was able to convince the 
electorate to ratify incorporation with little trouble. There was no 
highly organized opposition, although individuals still expressed the 
opinion that municipalities were yet another level of unnecessary 
potential taxation. The proponents argued in their literature that 
Carson was getting a reputation of being "that area with all those junk 
yards and rubbish dumps"; and in fact, there were 96 wrecking yards in 
the Carson area at the time of incorporation, half of them illegal 
according to county ordinance. The proponents claimed that the county 
was simply indifferent about enforcing its own ordinances, and that 
incorporation was necessary to rid Carson of blight. Only local control 
of zoning enforcement would "stop our area from being contaminated with 
junk yards, dumps, cemeteries, and any other unwanted and unsightly 
projects that have been shoved down our throats for years. And most 
importantly, their campaign literature proclaimed, in capital letters, 
that they would be able to provide city services "without the need for 
a city property tax. " The incorporationists won by a three-to-one 
majority. 
Since that time, the city of Carson has lived up to the 
expectations of the incorporationists. The illegal wrecking yards were 
eliminated, and the total number of such yards reduced to 24 by 1978. 
Most strikingly, the city has been able to carry on without a property 
tax, one of 22 cities in the county to do so in Fiscal Year 71, one of 
only 5 in Fiscal Year 77. 
Furthermore, Carson had one of the most successful records 
of growth in property tax base during the seventies. The seventies have 
been a period in which most of the cities in the county have experienced 
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been a period in which most of the cities in the county havelexperienced 
a growth in assessable property per capita less than the rate o 
Carson, on the other hand, has had a 5% inc::e in per capija 
Property, even controlling for inflation, rising from $3344 jo 
the first seven years of the decade. 
inflation. 
_ssessable �3863 in 
Long Beach on the other hand, has for the first time �n its 
history, experienced in the seventies a prolonged decrease ij its tax 
base in the decade after Carson' s incorporation blocked off J111prospects 
for area growth. During all its history, it has had a favorJble tax 
base, but during the first seven years of the seventies, its !taxable 
property per capita dropped from $3758 to $2747, a decrease ,f over 
one-quarter. To keep up services, it has had to increase its mµnicipal 
tax rate from 1. 5222 to 2. 171, a fact which may explain why �ts l population 
has experienced the first significant drop, falling from oveJ 3�8, 000 in 
1970 to a little over 341, 000. 
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The Case of La Habra Heights 
While Carson was LAFCO's first incorporation, the most recent 
incorporation is that of La Habra Heights. Located in the eastern-most 
portion of the county, between Whittier and the Orange County line, 
La Habra Heights is primarily a semi-rural, residential area, consisting 
of single-family residential units on one-acre lots. A minority of the 
population, however, lives in a few densely populated developments on 
the fringe of Whittier and Orange County. 
At the initial hearing on the proposed incorporation, on 
June 22, 1977, the opponents spoke first. The opponents of the incor-
poration were primarily from the developed southern fringe. The president 
of the property owners assocation of La Habra Heights argued that incor­
poration was proposed by the horse-loving homeowners of the rural northern 
sections, whose primary purpose was to "restrict development and maintain 
a horse-oriented community." 
Other opponents challenged the LAFCO staff report, which had 
said the city was financially viable. The staff report, which estimated 
annual expenditures for the city at over $763,000, had also estimated 
annual revenues of over $834, 000. However, $530,000 of this estimated 
revenue came from revenue sharing, at $100 per person for $5, 300. The 
opponents pointed out that this was an entirely unreasonable figure, 
since no city in the county received as much as $40 per capita in 
revenue sharing, and comparable cities received more like $5 a person, 
a figure which would leave an estimated annual deficit of over $4, 000,000 
or over half the budget. Opponents also claimed that the projected budget 
underestimated insurance costs. 
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The proponents then spoke for incorporation, 
the charges regarding financial viability of the city. 
wittiout answering 
o:����o •toff. opponents, they expressed gratitude for the assistance 
They said they lived in a rural area, growing avocados and !animals, and 
•�<od to p<e•e�e i< � e nat�el �ee. With <he coope<arli� of the 
co�<y, <hey had developed e C�uni<y Gene<el Plen in AugJ,, � 1975, and 
claimed they could not maintain the one-acre minimum zoninJ as an unin­
corporated area. At this, the county supervisor for their lsurl ervisorial 
district, who was on LAFCO, reacted defensively with regard t the 
eff�cacy of county zoning, but they maintained the necessi<� [I f incorpo­
ration. 
The proponents also had youth representatives as�in LAFCO not 
to deny them the benefits of growing up in a rural area. I l The session was continued until July 27, in ordenl t· consider boundary changes. At that meeting, the LAFCO staff issued a tevised 
<epo<< which men<ioned the difficul<y of calcule<ing <he rJVelue-•haring formula, and mentioned that revenue sharing could provide betteen $21,000 
�d $530;000. I< aleo included <he po••ibili<y of a $1.00 <� ra<e, 
which would generate $268,000, still not enough to cover tHe lrojected 
expendi<ure• if <evenu�•h�ing <u�ed ou< to be � the 101 •>de of <he 
''"'", ''e"ime<e". I< e1'o reco-nded <ha< chm piem If I developed acreage along the Orange County line be excluded from the bloutdaries of 
the proposed incorporation, noting that they are "fully urbanized, 
developed with single-family residential units, have curbs, gltters, 
and street lights, and have little in common with the lifestyle of the 
rest of the La Habra Heights area." 
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At this July 27th hearing, persons from these urbanized areas 
supported exclusions, as did spokespersons from other similar urbanized 
areas that had not contacted the LAFCO staff in the period of time between 
the meetings. However, a motion to "accept the staff report" was passed, 
meaning that those urbanized areas which had contacted LAFCO staff were 
successful in their exclusion, while those that had not contacted the 
staff were not. A spokesperson for one of the latter areas, in a later 
private discussion, blamed himself, because he had "been sleeping" when 
the other areas had been consulting the LAFCO staff. 
In the brief discussion preceeding the vote on the motion, the 
various commissioners voiced bouts about the financial viability of the 
proposed new city, and worried aloud about the fact that they were creating 
new "islands" on the county line. However, after repeated reference to the 
need to let the majority speak through an incorporation election, they 
decided to approve the petition with the exclusions. 
At the County Board of Supervisors meeting, the supervisors, too, 
worried about the financial viability of the city, but were told by their 
county counsel that they could return the proposal to LAFCO only for 
boundary re-hearings. They set the election date for November, 1978. 
The residents of the excluded, developed county islands 
expressed appreciation that they had "got out and lowered their tax rate", 
but expressed great dissatisfaction with their services from the county. 
One resident told me that after calling the county sheriff, the department 
had called her back and asked her how to get to her home. They really 
wanted to join La Habra in Orange County, but did not know how to do so. 
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The opponents of incorporation hired a consultant wht had fought 
previous incorporations, and sought a grand jury indictment ag inst LAFCO 
for fraud and prejudicial abuse of duty. As of this writing, there is no 
I 
word on the result of this proceeding. 
19 
Implications 
1. The county government in Los Angeles has long sought to 
maintain a strong leadership position in metropolitan government, 
especially vis-a-vis the major city governments, Los Angeles and Long 
Beach. In this competitive atmosphere, the urbanization of the county 
after World War II was a major threat to county government, since 
historically municipal incorporation had meant less of a role for 
county government in the provision of urban services. The Lakewood Plan 
was a major victory for county government, representing as it did a means 
by which the county could increase the strength and vigor of its admini-
strative agencies by providing services for the urbanizing areas even as 
they incorporated. The county government was thus prepared to accept 
almost any Lakewood Plan incorporation, while discouraging annexation. 
On the other hand, the county had only a minority of votes on 
the LAFCO board, which represented some of the political forces that the 
county was competing against--in the case of Carson, Long Beach. It 
seems fairly obvious that, for strictly political reasons, the Carson 
controversy would have been resolved differently if the county board of 
supervisors, rather than LAFCO, had had the responsibility. 
The position that LAFCO is a potential threat to the county' s 
position of predominance is underscored by the major controversy 
surrounding LAFCOs in the late seventies--the question of county service 
areas. Since urban services in municipalities are paid for by municipal 
taxes, while urban services in unincorporated areas are paid for by 
county-wide taxes, incorporated areas have in effect subsidized unincor-
porated areas, of up to $50 million annually. The creation of County 
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Service Areas would shift the burden of urban services for unincorporated 
areas to those areas themselves. The county view has opposldjthe creation 
of county services areas, which would encourage further incbr oration of 
most of the remaining unincorporated territory, and LAFCO vbt s have 
barely supported the county position, most recently by a su�pjise defection 
of Palmdale Mayor from the city position, amidst charges ofl c:unty 
politicking. It is doubtful that the county can maintain its l position 
on this issue indefinitely. 
l 2. A second implication of the Carson case is th tlwhile LAFCO 
represents a somewhat different mix of political influences!, l'.he name of 
the game is still politics, not planning according to techn�c 1 criteria 
as was originally hoped. There was no technical criterion �ol the July, 
1967, decision which resulted in exclusions and annexations! o� some of the 
proposed Carson incorporation. This decision clearly was trelresult of a 
political balancing of influence among Carson, the county, �o*g Beach, 
Los Angeles and Compton. 
3. A third implication is that there is no seriouslreason to
expect that LAFCO will be any more successful than previou: l-institutional 
structures in dealing with problems of urban sprawl, inequ�ils among 
municipalities, or even special-interest incorporations. t I 
For instance, the 1967 proposed Carson incorporatiot would have 
left no "islands" of difficult-to-service unincorporated ti r:i..tory. 
DMpi<e Che fao< Chae theoe "fal=do" �rn o=oidmd one 1' lhe opeoial 
problems of urban sprawl that LAFCOs were to deal with, the LAFCO staff 
and board went out of their way to � these islands as la bolitical 
21 
solution t6 a particular political problem. Now that they have been created, 
these islands pose serious problems with regard to the delivery of urban 
services, and are not in the least coveted by any of the cities involved, 
as they are residential areas with a poor ratio of expected tax benefit 
to service expense. 
This problem is seen repeatedly in subsequent incorporation pro­
posals before LAFCO. The Rancho Palos Verdes incorporation created a 
fourth exclusive suburb on the Palos Verdes peninsula in southwest Los 
Angeles County. Despite the fact that there are four cities on a fairly 
small peninsula, LAFCO allowed "islands" to be left behind by this incor-
poration, as well. In fact, County Supervisor Kenneth Hahn took the 
occasion of the Ranch Palos Verdes incorporation to condemn LAFCO' s  inade-
quacies in this regard: 
If anyone can figure out how you can have these islands and 
hobgoblin lines for a central services and know here police and 
fire equipment should go or what city a person is in • . .  it' s un­
believable we' re still putting cities that look like this. 
• • .  the Local Formation Agency was created by the legislature 
• • •  But, I haven' t really been impressed with their actions. They 
are still creating these monstrosities of designs of lines. 
· 
I was hoping that they would come with uniform lines and uniform 
areas, and they pretty well have slowed it down, but they are 
still creating those incorporations that make no sense of logic 
or reason. (Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors, 1973:46-47. ) 
Baxter Ward, something,of a "maverick" on the County Board of 
Supervisors, has pointed out another instance of LAFCO allowing islands 
to continue. Sun Village is a post-war development for middle-class 
blacks east of Palmdale. While Palmdale has been annexing huge tracts 
of territory in the Antelope Valley, they have ignored Sun Village, 
because it has deteriorated rapidly, with terrible roads and other urban 
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services that are "incredibly bad". Although Ward suggested Iha[ annexa­
tions be stopped until the Sun Village problem is solved, LAFGO as allowed 
Palmdale to ignore Sun Village. I The La Habra Heights case, too, resulted in LAFCO-cuea1 ed islands,  
this time in an area along the county line with extremely difnicult access. 
Nor has LAFCO done anything about the problem of inJqu�ties of 
tax base and service delivery. Two of the four cities createJ uhder LAFCO 
administration Ranch Palos Verdes and La-Canada-Flintridge l1oµg with 
La Habra Heights, are homogeneously white, rich suburbs, incojpo�ated with 
the explicit intention of maintaining their exclusive nature Jy �oning. 
LAFCO made no hint that this might be an inadequate reason foj ircorporation, 
or that these incorporations might exacerbate a problem of inJqualities and 
segregation of income classes and races in the county. 
4. A final implication of these cases is the weakness! of the
mechanism for governing municipal incorporations in Los AngelJs �ounty. 
The only book-length, academic discussion of LAFCOs found "esJentially 
negative findings" after looking for any significant change ij t e annual 
rate of annexations, incorporations, or special district formltibns 
(LeGates, 1970:59) . However, it found the most promising, poJit�ve 
characteristic of LAFCOs was their increasing ability and wiJlirgness to 
engage in planning. These cases reveal little of this capaciJy. Instead, 
they reveal a LAFCO board that is willing to follow staff dec�sibns where 
no political considerations apply, and a staff that is too sml11� over-
worked, or for other reasons unable to make accurate forcasts lonlthe 
financial viability of proposed municipal incorporations. 
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In short, the post-war pattern of urban sprawl, inequities of 
service delivery, and segregation of races and income classes has pro-
ceeded without interruption under LAFCO, and there is little reason to 
believe that, without major overhaul, the system will improve in the future. 
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